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intention of the parties can be asce*rtained. There was no inten-
tion to make an illegal contract; and to hold it illegal, we must be
able to say that the mere fact that Scott forwarded this note to his
surety for his signature, and that it was signed and delivered by
the surety in Ohio, and the money there paid (more than probably
as a mere matter of convenience), has the effect of defeating the
intention of the parties. It is difficult to perceive upon what prin-
ciple we should so find.
We do not, in thus holding, encourage two citizens of Ohio, to
attempt to contract here for money to be used here, and make their
notes payable in another state; nor, in any way, relax the strictness
of the rules which prevent any form of evasion of the law against
usury; but we hold that it is not repugnant to such laws for a
person to contract with reference to the law of his domicile, for
money to be used there, when no such evasion is sought or
intended.
Judgment affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
2
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND. 8
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI. 4
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. 5
ADMIRALTY. See Shipping.
Damages for Collision-Appellate Jurisdiction.-The libellant in a suit
in rem, in admiralty, against a vessel, for damages growing out of a colli-
sion, claimed, in his libel, to recover $27,000 damages. After the attach-
ment of the vessel in the District Court, a stipulation in the sum of
$2100, as her appraised value, was given. The libel having been dis-
missed by the Circuit Court on appeal, the libellant appealed to the U. S.
Supreme Court: Hfeld, that the matter in dispute did not exceed the sum
or value of $5000, exclusive of costs, as required by sect. 3 of the Act
of February 16th 1875, and that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1882. The cases will probably appear in 107 Otto.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 105 I1. Reports.
s From J. Shaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 59 Md. Reports.
4 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 76 Mo. Reports.
6 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 38
or 39 Ohio St. Reports.
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of the appeal : Starin v. Schooner Jessie Williamson, J.-., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1882.
A decree against the vessel for $27,000 would not establish the lia-
bility of the claimant to respond for that amount in personam, unless he
was the owner of the vessel at the time of the collision, and that fact
must appear by the record, in order to be so far a foundation for such
liability as to authorize the court to consider the $27,000 as the value
of the matter in dispute on such appeal : .d.
AGENT.
Contract-Enforcement of by Principal.-Where an agent enters into
a contract without disclosing his principal or agency, the principal, if he
takes advantage of the contract, must do so subject to all the right[an d
equities of which the other contracting party, who had no knowledge
of the agency, might avail himself as against the agent, assuming the
latter to be a principal: Hiller's Ex'rs. v. Sullivan, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
Liability for Tort in Business of Principal-Distinction between Gen-
eral Superintendent and Intermediate Manager.-The law is estiblished
that in the case of an agent or steward committing a tort while acting
within the scope of his employment, he and his employer may be sued
'separately or jointly at the election of the party injured. Nor is it
material to the latter's right to sue, in what proportions, if any, they
share the benefits of the wrongful act: Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. Me-
Oulloh, 59 Md.
The cases in which the intermediate manager or head employee has
been held not liable for trespasses of workmen under him, and in which
recourse can be had only to the actual wrongdoer, or to the master, on
the principle of Tespondeat superior, are distinguishable from those
where the tort is in consequence of the command or neglect of the gen-
eral superintendent: Id.
ASSIGNMENT. See Bank; Estoppel.
ATTORNEY.
Striking from Roll-Breach of Private Trust.-Where property is
conveyed to an attorney in trust, without his professional advice, and he
mortgages the same, fbr the purpose of raising a sum of money which
he claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards
sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own
use, the relation of client and attorney noi being created by such trust,
his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the position
of a trustee, is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him
on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but
the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit: The People
v. Appleton, 105 111.
Although the general rule is, that an attorney at law will not be dis-
barred for misconduct not in his professional capacity, but as an indi-
vidual, there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in
his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his dis-
barment: id.
BANK. See National- Bank:
.otice-Assignment for Creditors- Cheek antedated.-L. & Co. made
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an assignment for the benefit of creditors, under the insolvent laws of
Ohio, on September 26th 1874. On September 29th 1874, L. & Co.
gave their check on the First National Bank of Ravenna to H. & S.,
and dated it back to September 22d. On September 29th, the bank
paid the check, with knowledge of the assignment of L. & Co., but
without knowledge that the check had been dated back: Held, in an
action by the assignee of L. & Co. to recover moneys on deposit with
the bank at the date of the assignment, the knowledge of the bank that
L. & Co. had made an assignment prior to the presentation of the check,
put it upon inquiry as to whether or not the check had in fact been
given before the assignment. And such payment of the check would
not be a defence for the bank: Chaffe v. First .7rational Bank of Ra-
-enna, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
Sale of Stock-Representations of Officer-National Bank- Ultra
Tires.-A person buying stock of a bank from the bank is entitled to
rely upon assurances of an officer of the bank as to its financial condi-
tion ; and, if already a stockholder, is not bound to avail himself of his
right of examining the books of the bank: Union Nat. Bank v. Hunt,
76 Mo.
A representation by a bank officer that stock of his bank is worth
S100 per share is a mere expression of opinion or commendation of the
stock, and if it turns'out to be false a note taken by him for the price
of the stock will not thereby be avoided though it was relied on by the
purchaser, but it is otherwise with a representation that the bank is in
a solvent condition and doing a good business: .d.
When a national bank purchases its own stock to protect itself from
loss upon a debt, it is bound to sell the stock within six months, and
may sell on credit and take the purchaser's note, with the stock sold as
collateral to secure it, provided this is done in good faith : Id.
An abuse of the corporate powers is not a sufficient defence to such
a note. The question of misuser will not be decided collaterally by set-
ting aside a sale otherwise good : Id.
Chleck-Riglt of Holder to Balance in Bank.-A bank is under no
obligation to pay any sum on a check payable to the drawer's order and
by him assigned, when the drawer has not sufficient money on deposit
to his credit in the bank to pay the check in full, and no recovery in
such case can be had by the assignee. The rule may be different when
the drawer himself is plaintiff: Coates v. Preston, 105 Ill.
BILLS AND NOTES. See United States Courts.
Letter of Credt-Liability on- Consideration of Drafts.-In order
to render the writer of a letter of credit liable, either upon an implied
acceptance of, or an agreement to accept, drafts taken on the faith of
such letter, the drafts must be taken for a valuable consideration ! Sher-
win v. Brighamn, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
A'promise to have the drafts discounted, and to take up notes on
which the persons taking the drafts are liable as indorsers, is not a val-
uable consideration: Id.
If a letter of credit provides that drafts drawn under its authority shall
be used only for the purpose of being discounted at a particular bank,
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persons taking such drafts, with notice that they have been offered to
the bank for discount and refused, cannot recover thereon : Id.
Signature obtained through Milisrepresentation as to Character of
Paper.-In an action by the holder of a promissory note against the
person purporting to be the maker, the defendant testified that he had
never given the note in suit, nor had ever seen the paper before its pro-
duction in court. At this point he was interrupted by his counsel, who
admitted that the signature was genuine. The defendant then testified
in detail to his having been approached on the day of the date of the
note by a person representing himself to be the agent of the persons
named as payees, and who solicited him to become their agent; that he
finally consented and signed a contract of agency in duplicate; and that
he signed no other papers on that day or on any other day, and never
signed such a paper as the note in suit, at all, and never saw it before
seeing it in court. On a prayer offered by the plaintiff asserting the
legal insufficiency of the defendant's evidence as a defence, it was held,
that to render the defendant liable on said paper he must have been
aware at the time of signing the same, or possessed opportunities, such
as a reasonable cautious man would have exercised, of knowing that he
was signing a note for the payment of money, as represented by the
paper; and that although the genuine signature of the defendant was
subscribed to the paper, he was not liable thereon, if his signature was
obtained surreptitiously and by fraud, and with an understanding at the
time had with the payees or their agent that he was signing a paper of
a different character: Kagel v. Totten, 59 Md.
CHARITY.
Gift for, 'when valid.-Sect. 2419 of the Code of Georgia is as fol-
lows: "No person leaving a wife or child, or descendants of a child,
shall by will devise more than one-third of his estate to any charitable,
religious, educational or civil institution, to the exclusion of such wife
or child; and in all cases the will containing such devise shall be exe-
cuted at least ninety days before the death of the testator, or such devise
shall be void: Held, not to invalidate a charitable devise contained in
a will executed within ninety days before the testator's death, unless he
leaves a wife or child or descendants of a child : Jones v. Habersham,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
CHEox. See Bank.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Municipal Corporation.
CO-MMON CARRIER.
Delay in delivery-Liability for-Form of Action-1M1easure of
Damages.-In actions against a common carrier, for the breach of a
contract for the carriage and delivery of goods, the suit may be framed
either ex contractu, upon the breach of the engagement, or ex delicto,
upon the violation of the public duty. But whether the action be
assumpsit on the contract, or case for the violation of duty, the same
law is applicable to both classes of action, and the measure of damages
is equally a question of law, and as much under the control of the
court, as if the right rested in agreement only: .Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Pumphreg, 59 Md.
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As a general rule the measure of damages in such cases is the value
of the goods at their place of destination, with compensation for the
actual loss, which is the natural and proximate consequence of the act,
and excluding remote or indirect losses. The loss sustained by the
plaintiff in his general business does not come under this rule: Id.
Common carriers deliver property at their peril; for if delivery be to
a wrong person, they will be responsible to the rightful owner. It is
their duty, therefbre, in all cases to be diligent in their efforts to secure
a delivery to the person entitled, and they will be protected in refusing
delivery until reasonable evidence is furnished them, that the party
claiming is the party entitled, so long as they act in good faith and
solely with a view to a proper delivery; but it is their duty in all cases
to be diligent in their efforts to secure a delivery to the person entitled:
Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Eminent Domain.
Power to amend Charters of Corporation.-The Constitution of
Georgia provides that "the General Assembly shall have no power to
grant corporate powers and privileges to private companies, except, &c.
* * * But it shall prescribe by law the manner in which such powers
shall be exercised by the courts :" eld, not to take away from the
General Assembly the power to amend the charters of existing corpora-
tions by modifying or enlarging their powers ; Jones v. Habersham, S.
C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
Suit by one of the United States to recover a Debt due to its Citizens
by another State.-The states of New Hampshire and New York,
passed Acts of Assembly authorizing the assignment to the state of
claims of citizens against another state and the prosecution of suits
thereon in the name of the state, but at the expense and for the benefit
of the assignors: field, that suits brought under these acts were within
the eleventh amendment to the constitution declaring that the judicial
power "shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens
of another state :" The State of New Hfampshire v. The State of Louis-
iana, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
The right of suit against a state granted to the citizen by the original
constitution took away any indirect remedy he might otherwise have
claimed through the intervention of his state, upon any principle of the
law of nations; the eleventh amendment took away this special remedy
without restoring any power taken away by its original grant: Id.
One state can not create a- controversy with another state within the
meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the constitution
by assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other state to its
citizens : -d.
Law with one Object and Expression of same in Title.-The Consti-
tution of New Jersey provides : " To avoid improper influences which
may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as
have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one
object, and that shall be expressed in the title :" Hield, that this
provision does not require that the title of an act shall embody a detailed
statement, nor be an index or abstract, of its contents; nor does it
prevent the uniting in the same act of any number of provisions
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having one general object fairly indicated by its title ; and that the
powers, however varied and extended, which a new township may exer-
cise constitute but one object which is fairly expressed by a title show-
ing nothing more than the legislative purpose to establish such township:
Township of Montclair v. Ramsdell, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
CONTRACT. See Rescission.
Illegality of-Rights of Co-Principals against each other.-While
courts will not enforce an illegal contract between the parties, yet, if an
agent of one of the parties has, in the prosecution of the illegal enterprise
for his principal, receive& money or other property belonging to his
principal, he is bound to turn it over to him, and cannot shield himself
from liability therefor upon the ground of the illegality of the original
transaction : Norton v. Blinn, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
CORPORATION. See Bank; Constitutional Law.
DAMAGES. See Common Carrier.
• EQUITY.
Feigned Issue-.Not demandable of Right.-An issue of fact from a
court of equity to be tried by a jury is not a matter of right, at any
stage of the proceeding; and in the exercise of a discretion it should
only be allowed where the proof before the judge creates doubt, by
reason of conflict or doubtful credibility of witnesses, or where from a
mass of circumstances, it may be difficult to draw a proper conclusion.
It is never allowed as a substitute for the failure of proof, or for omitted
evidence: Chase v. Winans, 59 Md.
A court of equity has full power and right to decide every question
of law or fact which may arise out of the subject-matter before it, and
over which it has jurisdiction; and the trial by issue forms no necessary
incident to the proceedings of such court. It is resorted to simply as a
means of informing the conscience of the court, and is not binding upon
it: Id.
P .leading--fultifariousness.-A bill against several defendants to set
aside several distinct conveyances made to them separately on the
ground of fraud, one general right being claimed, is not multifarious
Bobb v. Bobb, 76 Mo.
Bill to remove Cloud from Title-Possession of Defendant.-There
are only two cases, under the laws of Illinois, in which a party may file
a bill to quiet title or remove a cloud from the title to real property :
First, when he is in possession of the lands; and second, when he
claims to be the owner, and the lands in controversy are unimproved
and unoccupied: Gould v. Sternburg, 105 Ill.
Where the defendants are in the actual possession of land, though
acquired by force and violence, a court of equity will not undertake to
determine the validity of the respective titles of the parties, but will
leave the complainant to his remedy at law. The rule is of general
application, that where there is a plain and adequate remedy at law a
court of equity will not interfere: d.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Condemnation of Land-Amount of Land necessary-How deter-
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mined.-Where the description of the land and the purpose for which
it is sought to be taken are stated in the petition, as they must be in
every case, whether the land is reasonably necessary for the purpose
stated depends mainly upon the facts thus stated in the petition. But
the court in passing upon this question, as it must before submitting
the question of damage or compensation to the jury, should take into
consideration the section of the country and the particular locality in
which the improvement is to be constructed-whether in an obscure
country village, or in a great commercial centre-and acting upon its
own knowledge of the commerce and business necessities of the country,
must, upon the facts stated in the petition, determine this question for
itself. The jury impanelled can find no fact except what is just com-
pensation to the owner : Smith v. C. & W. I Railroad Co., 105 Ill.
Every company seeking to condemn land for a public improvement
must, in a modified degree, be permitted to judge for itself as to the
amount that is necessary for such purpose. This right is subject to all
constitutional and statutory restrictions, and to the further limitation
that the courts are clothed with ample power to prevent any abuse of
the same : Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See Admiralty.
Right of Administrator.-An administrator may maintain an appeal
from an order of payment on the ground that it lays down a rule of ap-
portionment which works injustice as between the creditors of the
estate: In re Estate of Ale Cune, 76 Mo.
Waiver of Appeal- Consideration.-By an agreement, free from all
shadow of fraud, mistake or surprise, signed by counsel representing
the executors, and others interested in the distribution of a testator's
estate, and filed in the case, the right of appeal from a decree passed
some six months previously, construing certain clauses of the testator's
will, was waived, and consent was given to the passage of a decree for
the final distribution of the testator's estate. Accordingly an order was
passed for the immediate distribution of the residue. The consideration
moving to K., one of the parties to the agreement, to waive his right
of appeal, was the immediate possession of his share of the residue of
the estate without further litigation or delay. Held, that the agreement
to waive his right of appeal was binding, being supported by a sufficient
legal consideration, and K. was concluded thereby from maintaining an
appeal : .Afackey v. Daniel, 59 Md.
ESTOPPL. See Former Recovery.
Assignment of Stock by blank Power of Attorney-Bona fide Pur-
chaser.-Where certificates of stock in a private corporation are assigned
in blank, with a power of attorney authorizing the transfer of the stock
on the books of the corporation, with no limitation as to their use by
the assignee, the assignee or holder will be authorized, as to persons
dealing with him without notice of any defect of power in him, to make
any Idgitimate use of them a rightful owner might, and a sale or pledge
of such certificates by him, in the usual course of business, to a party
taking in good faith for value, will be valid and binding on the original
owner or assignor, though the legal title may not have passed, for want
of a transfer on the books of the corporation : Otis v. Gardner, ]05 Ill.
VoL. XXXI.-61
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If the owner of property or choses in action voluntarily clothes
another with the indicia of ownership, by which the latter is enabled
to sell or pledge the same, for his own benefit, to an innocent party for
value, the former can have no relief against such act to the prejudice
of the pledgee or vendee. Where one of two or more persons must
suffer loss, it must fall upon him whose conduct made it possible for loss
to occur: Id.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See Errors and Appeals.
FIXTURES.
Tests as to what constitutes-Evidence of Custom.-Whether a chat-
tel becomes a fixture or not does not depend so much upon the character
of the fastening by which it is held down (whether slight or otherwise),
as upon the nature of the article, and its use as connected with the use
of the freehold. As between the mortgagor and mortgagee, the true
criterion consists in the united application of several tests : 1st, Real or
constructive annexation of the article in question to the realty. 2d,
Ajpropriation or adaptation to the use or purpose of that part of the
realty with which it is connected. 3d. The intention of the party mak-
ing the annexation, to make the article a permanent accession to the
freehold, this intention being inferred from the nature of the article
affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation
and the policy of the law in relation thereto, the structure and mode of
the annexation and the purpose or use for which the annexation has
been made: Thomas v. Davil, 76 Mo.
As between landlord and tenant, evidence of custom with respect to
chattels annexed to the realty, .by which they are treated as personalty,
is admissible, but not so with respect to articles annexed by a mortgagor
or grantor before the execution of his conveyance : -rd.
FORMER RECOVERY.
Waiver of Defences not pleaded-Not aplicable to Defence constitu-
ting Counter-claim-Equitable Title.--The general rule is that a defend-
ant is bound to set up every defence, legal or equitable, or both, which
he may have to the action, and waives those not pleaded; but where the
facts claimed to afford a defence are sufficient to constitute a counter-
claim, there is an exception to such general rule : Witte v. Lockwood,
38 or 39 Ohio St.
A defendant relying solely on his legal title, in an action to recover
the possession of real property, and failing, is not estopped to maintain
an action to correct mistakes in the deeds under which the parties to
such action respectively claimed. Be has his election to rely on such
equitable title as a defence or a counter-claim, or he may maintain an
action thereon : Id.
Assumpsit and Trover-Recove?-y in One a Bar to Other.-The law
is adverse to multiplying suits, and if a party has a choice between two
actions upon the same demand, and he selects one, which is decided by
a competent tribunal, either for or against him, as a general rule he
will not be permitted to resort to the other : Walsh v. Chesapeake and
Ohio Canal Co., 59 Md.
. The plaintiffs recovered judgment in an action of assumpsit, and
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afterwards sued the same defendant in an action of trover, to recover
damages for the conversion of the same property which had formed the
subject of the action of assumpsit. On a plea of former recovery it was
held, that in the judgment in the first action the cause of action was
merged, and could only have been revived by apt proceedings terminat-
ing in striking the judgment from the record in the court of original
jurisdiction, or by its reversal on appeal : Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR.
Suit by Wife for Sale to Rutsband-Independent Sales by, two Persons
-Joint Liability.-In an action by a wife against two persons for injury
to her means of support resulting from the habitual intoxication of her
husband caused by intoxicating liquors sold and furnished him by the
defendants, and where, from the facts found, it appeared that the defend-
ants each sold intoxicating liquors to the husband, and that they were
in no way connected in business, and that neither of them was in any
way interested in the sales made by the other; but that the husband of
the plaintiff, during the time in which the sales were made, was habit-
ually intoxicated, and that the sales were made by both defendants with
knowledge of this fact, and the sales thus made contributed to keep up
said habit: Held, that the defendants were jointly liable: Rantz v.
Barnes, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
LiBEL.
False Statement as to Coiviction of Crime.-The publication in a
newspaper of a false statement that a person was convicted and sentenced
to prison for libel, is actionable, without proof of special damage:
Boogher v. Knapp, 76 Mo.
IALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Civil Sui -i junction- Corpora tion-feasure of Damages-.Mining
Company.-The N. C. Co., a corporation, with malice and without pro-
bable cause, sued U. and others, in a civil action and by an order of
injunction made on its ex parte application, prevented U. and others
from entering upon and enjoying their property, and also from prose-
cuting a profitable business. After a year bad passed, the N. C. Co.
dismissed its action. U. and others thereupon sued the company, claim-
ing damages for said malicious prosecution : hteld, 1. They can maintain
the action. 2. The measure of the damages is the value of the right
of U. and others to possess their property and prosecute their business
during said period of ouster and suspension : i. e., the value of the use
of the property, in the business, during that time: Newarkc Coal Co.
v. U pson, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. See Ordinance.
Countes-Property of subject to Legislative control.-The property
of a county being held for the public, it is under the uncontrolled power
of the General Assembly, which is not restricted or limited in its absolute
control over the same. A county can neither hold nor dispose of pro-
perty except by constitutional or legislative authority, and the legislature
has the power to sell or dispose of it without the consent of the county
authorities : Harris v. Board of Supervisors of Whiteside Co., 105 Ill.
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Bonds of Municipal Corporations-Irregularity in Election by which
they were authorized- United States Court when not bound by Decisions
of State Court.-Where a municipal corporation in pursuance of legis.
lative authority voted a donation to a railroad company, and issued bonds
to pay the same which recited, on their face, that an election had been
held in accordance with the authorizing statutes : Held, 1. That a aefect
in the method of holding the election by which the donation was voted
in no way impairs the validity of the bonds in the hands of a bona.fide
holder. 2. That a decision of the state Supreme Court declaring that
in consequence of such irregularity the bonds are void in the hands of
bona fide holders is not binding on the U. S. Supreme Court. The pro-
position is one which falls among the general principles and doctrines
of commercial jurisprudence, as to which it is the duty of the latter
court to form an independent judgment, and in respect to which it is
under no obligation to follow implicitly the conclusions of any other
court however learned or able it may be: Town of Pana v. Bowler,
S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
NATIONAL BANK. See Bank.
Power to receive Special Deposits-Liability for-Evdence.-The
power to receive special deposits is conferred by the National Banking
Act, upon banks organized under that act: First -National Bank of
.Mansfield v. Zent, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
Where a national bank has been accustomed to receive United States
bonds as special deposits, gratuitously, it is liable for any loss thereof
occurring through the want of that degree of care which good business
men would exercise in keeping property of such value : id.
A demand of such bonds, and a refusal by the bank to deliver the
same, with no other explanation of such refusal than the statement that
the bank has no such bonds in its possession, furnish sufficient proof of
loss by such negligence as will render the bank liable therefor: Id.
Construction of National Banking Acts and Section 3466 Revised
Statutes-Claims of United States when -not Preferred.-The law of
1797, re-enacted in the Revised Statutes, giving priority to the demands
of the United States against insolvents cannot be applied to demands
against National Banks which have failed. The provisions of that law
and of the national banking law being, as applied to demands against
national banks, inconsistent and repugnant, the former must yield to the
latter, and is, to the extent of the repugnancy, superseded by it:
.National Bank v. The United States, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
At the time of its suspension a national bank had on deposit certain
"c postal funds" and "money-order funds" deposited by a deputy-post-
master. The Treasury Department, over and above a sum sufficient to
secure the circulation of the bank's notes, had $30,000 belonging to it,
but the liabilities of the bank exceeded its assets. ield. that the claim
of the United States for moneys so deposited by the deputy-postmaster
was not a preferred debt nor could it be set off against the surplus
moneys remaining in the treasury of the proceeds of bonds deposited
as security for the circulating the notes of the bank : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Railroad-Rate of Speed- Contributory Negligence-Duty of Court.
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-Aside from statutory or municipal regulation, .no rate of speed at
which a railroad train may be run is negligence per se: Powell v. The
Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 76 Mo.
In an action grounded upon allegations of negligence, if the undis-
puted facts show that notwithstanding the defendant's negligence, the
plaintiff would not have sustained the injuries complained of but for
his own negligence directly tending to produce them, it is the duty of
the court to direct the jury to find for defendant : Id.
Railroad-Escape of Fire-Presumption.-There is no legal pre-
sumption that a railroad company, while in the exercise of its lawful
right to run its locomotives and trains over its road and to use fire in so
doing, will not permit fire to escape from them: Palmer v. Missouri
Pacific Railway Co., 76 Mo.
The fact that a railroad company uses good machinery and the most
approved appliances to prevent the escape of fire, and has careful and
competent men in charge thereof, will not, in case fire does escape,
of itself rebut the prima facie inference of negligence or exempt the
company from liability for damages caused thereby : Id.
Railroad companies must use reasonable precautions to prevent fire
from being carried from their locomotives by such winds as are usual
and ordinary at the season and the place, and are only relieved from
making provision against extraordinary and unusual winds: Id.
NoTIOn. See Bank.
ORDINANCE.
Rules of Construction-Pay of Officers.-The charter and ordinances
of a city stand in the same relation to each other as the constitution and
statutes of a state, and the rules applicable in deciding questions of
conflict between the latter may be resorted to to determine similar ques-
tions between the former : Quinette v. City of St. Louis, 76 Mo.
Where a city charter provided that judges of election should receive
no pay, and repealed all existing ordinances inconsistent with its pro-
visions - Held, that an ordinance then in force providing for the pay
of judges and clerks of election was repealed only so far as it related to
the judges, and the clerks were entitled to pay at the rate fixed by the
ordinance: Id.
PARDON.
Fraud in Procuring-Effect of, on Habeas Corpus after re-arrest-
An unconditional pardon by the governor, delivered to and accepted
by one convicted of felony, cannot be treated as a nullity, in a proceed-
ing on habeas corpus prosecuted by such person against one who
re-arrested him basing his right to do so on the ground that the pardon
was granted by reason of acts of such convict affecting his health, done
with the fraudulent purpose of obtaining such pardon, and by reason of
fraudulent representations with respect to his health, made by such con-
vict with like fraudulent purpose: Knapp v. Thomas, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
PARTNERSHIP.
Employment for Share of Profits.-A contract was made between E.
and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, for the performance by
E. of certain work for said corporation. The contract provided for the
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
retention by the city of one-fifth of the money due upon the monthly
estimates, until the work was completed and accepted. Subsequently a
written agreement was made between E. and R. by which R. was to
superintend the work, and to receive therefor from E. one-sixth of the
net profits'arising from the contract with the city. It was further
stipulated by this agreement that R. should have the privilege of draw-
ing a fixed sum per month, to be charged against said one-sixth net
profits, and should have the privilege of inspecting the books of account
relating to the work; but in the concluding clause it was expressly
agreed that R. was not a partner with E. in said work, nor was he to be
in any manner liable for any damages growing out of its prosecution,
other than as such superintendent. A bill was filed by R. against E.
and certain assignees of E.'s interest in the contract with the city of
Baltimore, and against the said city, for a discovery, and account,
and a decree for the amount due him, and for a receiver to receive
all sums payable by the city under its contract, and an injunction
to prevent E. or his assignees from collecting, and the said city from
paying to them, the sums due under said contract. On demurrer to
said bill, it was Held, that in the face of the provision in the agree-
ment between E. and R. that R. should not be a partner, it could not
be said that the other clauses of the agreement, by which it was stipu-
lated that he should receive one-sixth of the net profits growing out
of the contract, as compensation for his management and superintendence
of the work, made him such partner: .Reddington v. Lanahan, 59 id.
PLEADING. See Equity.
PUBLIO POLICY. See Contract.
RAILROAD. See E minent Domain; Negligence.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Separable Controversy-.Local Prejudice Act.-A suit to recover
certain real estate occupied by one Myers, a citizen of New York, was
brought, in 1873, by citizens of North Carolina, in the state court,
against Myers alone; and in 1877 was amended, bringing in other
defendants, citizens of North Carolina, who, it was alleged, held the
legal title. Myers alone answered the amended complaint, in Sept.1877,
and in March 1878 petitioned for removal, filing an affidavit to the effect
that he had reason to believe, and did believe, that from prejudice or
local influence he would not be able to obtain justice in the state court:
Beld, 1. That the application was too late to secure the benefit of the
separable controversy provision in the Act of 1875. Such an applica-
tion should have been made at or before the term at which the cause
could be first tried, or rather, as this suit was begun before the Act of
1875 was passed, it should have been at or before the term at which the
cause could be first tried after the act went into operation. 2. That
while there is no doubt that the principal controversy is between Myers
and the plaintiffs, yet as the legal title is thought to be in the other
defendants, and the plaintiffs require the presence of the trustee defend-
ants, in order to get Myers out of possession, it follows that they are
not nominal but necessary parties ; and as, under the local prejudice
act, there can be no removal, unless all the necessary parties on one side
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of the suit are citizens of different states from those on the other, the
cause should be remanded to the state court: Xlfyers v. Swan, S. 0. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1882.
REScISSION
Purchaser must rescind in toto.-A party will not be permitted to
affirm a contract in part, and rescind as to the residue. If he rescinds
at all, he must do so in toto. The opposite party must be placed in
as good a condition as he was before the sale by a return of the property
purchased, unless it is entirely worthless: Harzfeld v. Converse, 105
Ill.
Where the plaintiff, in an action to recover back a portion of the pur-
chase price of certain goods, had purchased of the defendant six cases
of beavers under an entire contract, and upon receiving the same made
no objection to any part of them, and did not, before suit, offer to return
to the defendant all the goods, but confined his offer to return to a por-
tion, and expressly elected to retain the other part, it was held, that the
plaintiff could not recover, in an action for money had and received, the
price of the goods objected to : Id.
SALE. See Rescission.
SHIPPING.
njuryj to Property on Shore-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-Where,
through the negligence of those managing a steam tug-boat in towing a
schooner in the navigable waters of the Chicago river, the schooner is
run into an elevator situated on the land, breaking the same, and causing
the loss of a quantity of grain, the tort is not a maritime one and
within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court of admiralty. In such case
the state courts may afford a remedy for the injury : Johnson v. Elevator
Co., 105 Ill.
SPECIFIC PERFOR-IANCE.
Doub(ful Title- When good Defence -Every purchaser of land has
a right to demand and to have a title which shall enable him not only
to hold his land, but to hold it in peace ; and if he wishes to sell it to
be reasonably sure that no flaw or doubt will come up to disturb its mar-
ketable value. But the doubt must be considerable and rational, such
as would, and ought to induce a prudent man to pause and hesitate;
such as would produce a bona fide hesitation in the mind of the judge
passing upon the title: Gill v. Wells, 59 Md.
STATUTE.
Construction-Previous Construction.in other State.- Where the
statute of one state or country is re-enacted in another, the courts of
the latter state will place the same construction on it as had been given
to it by the courts of the state where it was originally enacted: Skrainka
v. Allen, 76 Mo.
STOCK. See Estoppel.
SURETY.
Trerbal iNotice to proceed against Principal-Extension of Time.-A
surety cannot base a claim to be released from his obligation on a verbal
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notice to the creditor to proceed against the principal debtor. To be
available the notice must be in writing: Betty v. Douglass, 76 Mo.
Part payment of a note after maturity is no valid consideration for
an extension of time: Id.
TRADE31ARK.
Bill to restrain use of Trademark dismissed when Trademark misrep-
resented the Person byi whom, an d place where, the Article was Manfac-
tured.-The Manhattan Medicine Company filed a bill to restrain
defendants from using the trademark " Attwood's Genuine Physical
Jaundice Bitters, Georgetown, Mass.," claiming to be the exclusive
owner of the formula and recipe for making the medicine, and of the
right of using the said name or designation. It was admitted that what-
ever value the nledicine possessed was given to it by its original manu-
facturer, Moses Attwood, who manufactured it at Georgetown, Mass.,
and that it is now manufactured by the plaintiffs in New York city.
Hleld, that the statement that the article was manufactured in a partic-
ular place, by a person whose manufacture there had acquired a great
reputation, when, in fact, it was manufactured by a different person at
a different place, is a fraud upon the public which no court of equity
will countenance, and that the bill must be dismissed : ifedicine Co. v.
Wood, S. C.-U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
The object of a trademark being to indicate, by its meaning or asso-
ciation, the origin or ownership of the articles, it would seem that when
a right to its use is transferred to others, either by act of the original
manufacturer or by operation of law, the fact of transfer should be stated
in connection with its use ; otherwise, a deception would be practised
upon the public and the very fraud accomplished, to prevent which courts
of equity interfere to protect the exclusive right of the original man-
ufacturer : Id.
TRIAL.
Practice-Admitting Evidence out of Order.-A sound exercise of
the discretion vested in the trial courts of determining whether or not
evidence should be received out of time, requires that when it appears
that failure to offer material evidence in proper time was the result of
inadvertence and that it was not kept back by a trick or for any unfair
purpose and that the other party will not be deceived or injuriously
affected by it, it should be let in even after a demurrer to the evidence
has been sustained. For refusal of the trial court so to do, the appel-
late court will reverse: Tierney v. Spiva, 76 Mo.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See .Afunicipal Corporation.
Indorseeof N ote secured byi .ortgage-Act of Congress March 3d
1875, c. 137.-Wh'en a promissory note, negotiable by the law merchant,
is made by a citizen of one state to a citizen of the same state, and secured
ny a m6rtgage from the maker to the payee, an indorsee of the note can,
since the act of March 3d 1875, e. 137 (1 Sup. Rev. Stat. 173), sue in
the courts of the United States to foreclose the mortgage, and obtain a
sale of the mortgaged property: Tredway v. Sanger, S. 0. U. S., Oct.
Term 1882.
